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Abstract:  
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be 
insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we 
investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a 
lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field data 
on these activities, the laboratory provides an excellent opportunity to study this question. We 
find that even the pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a 
decision-maker in favor of this party, even though it creates negative externalities to others. 
Although future rewards are not contractible, the benefitting party voluntarily compensates 
decision-makers for partisan choices. In this way, both receive higher payoffs, but aggregate 
welfare is lower than without a rewards channel. Thus, the outcome mirrors what might have 
been achieved via conventional bribing, while not being illegal. 
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1 Introduction  
Corruption and bribery is a pervasive feature across all political systems. Politicians or public 
officials have to make decisions that potentially favor one party at the expense of another. For 
example, a politician may have to vote either for a consumer-friendly or an industry-friendly 
legislation, and a public official may have to decide which of two competing firms is 
successful in the bid for a public contract. Bribing a decision-maker can be an effective way 
not to end up as the losing party, but has one obvious disadvantage – it is illegal. Whether this 
is sufficiently deterrent for the involved parties depends on the risk of being caught and the 
resulting penalties for bribery, and varies over countries and political systems. In Western 
democracies with strong rule of law, at least, bribery carries the constant threats of revelation 
by free media, prosecution by independent courts, and a negative backlash from voters and 
consumers for both the briber and the bribee. So while corruption is a way of establishing a 
relationship for mutual benefit between a lobbyist and a decision-maker, usually at the 
expense of others, there might be an interest in finding alternative ways of achieving the same 
goal without entering illegality.  
Our research question is whether conventional anti-corruption policies with a focus on 
bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In 
particular, we wonder whether a mutually beneficial relationship can also be maintained by an 
implicit agreement to exchange favors at two distinct points in time. This question is 
motivated by the fact that there are few outright corruption cases of high-ranking public 
officials in Western democracies, while after their political career they frequently enter 
business relationships with parties who might have benefitted from their previous decisions. 
Given that each party has an existential interest to conceal corruption (or activities closely 
bordering on corruption), appropriate field data are not available. Thus, the objective of the 
present paper is to explore this research question experimentally. 
In Western democracies there is a notable discrepancy between the monetary rewards 
of pursuing a political career during the years in office on the one hand, and the financial 
possibilities that can be exploited when a politician leaves office. A potential briber who 
refrains from bribing and instead establishes a relationship based on mutual gift-giving has 
various opportunities to reward a decision-maker after his political or administrative career, 
e.g. via honorariums for speeches or mandates, or by directly offering a position in the upper 
management level. A politician may anticipate this and proactively help the party which is 
more likely to reward him in the future. Of course, there are also legitimate reasons why a 
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firm may seek the experience of a person who had an important role in the public service, 
such as personal contacts and expert knowledge. However, the line between both motives is 
thin and often blurred. Conducting an experiment offers us the possibility to create an 
environment where we can eliminate all plausibly legitimate reasons for such a business 
relationship and focus entirely on whether such a long-term co-operation can be established as 
a result of the decision-maker being “helpful” in the preceding step.  
In our experiment, we first create a situation in which a decision-maker has to allocate 
points between two other participants, while his own payoff is unaffected. This reflects that - 
in the absence of illegal payments - a politician’s income is fixed and not related to the 
decisions he takes. In the second stage, we introduce the possibility that other players reward 
the decision-maker for his choice. Knowing this, the decision-maker gets the option to 
delegate his decision right, such that one self-interested player can impose her preferred 
allocation. A decision-maker may expect that doing another party a favor by delegating his 
decision right increases his reward. However, this is not contractible and entirely depends on 
the reciprocal inclinations of the party to whom the decision was delegated. It is thus 
uncertain whether such an arrangement of mutual favor trading can be similarly effective as 
corruption.1 
We find that even the pure anticipation of a future reward from a lobbying party 
suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even though it creates negative 
externalities to others. The favored party frequently reciprocates and voluntarily compensates 
the decision-maker for his partisan choice. In this way, they both end up with a higher payoff, 
but aggregate welfare is lower than without a rewards channel. Thus, we find that the 
outcome mirrors one that could have been achieved via a conventional bribery relationship. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we provide a brief and selective survey of 
economic research on corruption, with a focus on experiments. Section 3 explains the 
experimental design and section 4 makes behavioral predictions. Section 5 presents the results 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the difference between these two settings is not only that the order of moves is reversed (the briber 
first pays the reward, then the politician takes the decision) but also that the course of action is more 
consequentially in the case of bribery. Once a politician accepts a bribe, he already commits an illegal act. In 
contrast, a politician who implements the desired choice of a self-interested party can always claim that he found 
this option preferable himself.  
3 
 
2 Literature on corruption and gift-giving 
By its very nature as an illegal activity, obtaining objective data on corruption at the 
individual level is virtually impossible when both the briber and the receiver of the bribe are 
reaping benefits from it. Furthermore, the observed occurrence of bribing is not a particularly 
informative indicator for corruption as it confounds the occurrence of bribing with the 
authorities’ determination to crack down on corruption. A different scenario is when a person 
or firm is required to pay bribes to an official in order to receive a treatment it is actually 
entitled to. A prerequisite for this situation is that the rule of law is sufficiently weak for an 
official or politician to demand a bribe without being charged, and therefore we are more 
likely to encounter cases in developing countries. Svensson (2003) uses data on involuntary 
bribe payments reported by Ugandan firms and concludes that a firm’s “ability to pay” and 
“refusal power” explain a large part of variation in bribes. A different line of research uses 
information on perceived corruption from business risk surveys and investigates its 
determinants in a cross-country comparison. Treisman (2000), for example, comes to the 
interesting conclusion that while a long exposure to democracy predicts lower perceived 
corruption for the countries in his sample, the current state of democracy does not.  
In the situations described above, data for bribes are available because if they are paid 
involuntarily the entity which is forced to bribe may not have a need to conceal it. The focus 
of our paper, however, is on situations in which a bribe is paid voluntarily with the objective 
of gaining an unfair advantage. In this case, both sides commit an unethical and punishable 
act, and we should not expect that any of the two will admit this when asked in the context of 
a survey. Laboratory experiments offer the possibility of developing a better understanding of 
the underlying mechanisms when the relevant actors have no incentives for disclosure. 
The experiment designed by Abbink et al. (2002) represents essential features of 
corruption, such as a reciprocal relationship between bribers and public officials, negative 
welfare effects, and penalties in case of detection. They show how scope for reciprocity can 
establish a bribery relationship and that negative externalities had no moderating effect, while 
introducing a penalty threat did prove effective in reducing corruption. Using the same 
design, Abbink and Henning-Schmidt (2006) investigate whether the framing of the game in 
corruption terms as opposed to neutrally framed instructions had an effect on the behavior of 
subjects, but found no treatment difference. In contrast, Barr and Serra (2009) find that 
subjects were significantly less likely to offer bribes when a corruption frame was applied. 
Interestingly, Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) show that when bribers can choose whether to 
call it a “bribe” or a “gift”, around 20% of the subjects preferred the term “bribe” despite its 
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morally negative connotation. Potters and Van Winden (2000) compare the behavior of 
students with professional lobbyists and find that the latter behave more in line with game 
theoretic predictions and earn more money. Büchner et al. (2008) conduct an experiment to 
study bidding behavior in public procurement auctions and show that bribes are actively and 
frequently used although they were framed in negative terms. Finally, Abbink (2004) reports 
that a change in the matching protocol from partners to strangers significantly reduces 
corruption activity, suggesting that a staff rotation policy might be a partial remedy. 
Another related paper is the gift-giving experiment of Malmendier and Schmidt (2011). 
Their study is motivated by the excessive gift-giving practice of lobbyists in sectors such as 
the pharmaceutical industry, which is unconditional but clearly driven by the expectation of 
influencing the target group (i.e. medical doctors and other health care professionals). In their 
experimental setup a decision-maker acts on behalf of a principal and has to buy a product 
from one of two producers. One of the producers is randomly selected and receives the option 
to pass on a small gift to the decision-maker. Malmendier and Schmidt show that decision-
makers are significantly more likely to choose the product of the very producer who made the 
gift, even when the other product has a higher expected payoff and even though most 
decision-makers fully understand that the sole purpose of the gift was to influence them. This 
is an interesting result because it shows that a producer doesn’t have to go the illegal route of 
paying a bribe in order to gain an unfair advantage. Instead, it is possible to obtain a similar 
outcome by giving a seemingly unsuspicious gift. In our experiment we use a different design 
but follow a similar idea. By changing the order of moves we go one logical step further to 
see whether even the pure anticipation of a gift may result in favorable decisions for the 
potential gift giver and lead to outcomes that otherwise might have been achieved via bribing. 
Finally, our paper is related to the experimental literature concerned with the strategic 
motives and benefits of delegating tasks or decisions, beginning with Fershtman and Gneezy 
(2001). This line of research has shown that by delegating a decision to an agent, a principal 
can also shift the responsibility for the outcome to the agent (see e.g. Bartling and 
Fischbacher, 2011, or Coffman, 2011). Hamman et al. (2010) show that a principal, who is 
reluctant to take a self-serving action, may use an agent to achieve an outcome which is less 
pro-social than if he had taken the decision himself. However, delegation can also help to 
increase efficiency. Hamman et al. (2011) find that the contributions in a public goods game 
are higher when the decision is delegated to an elected agent, and Charness et al. 
(forthcoming) show that workers who can choose their wages themselves have significantly 
higher effort levels. In the latter case, delegation might pay off because both sides can 
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increase their earnings if workers reciprocate. This rationale for delegation is what we are 
interested also in our context. Delegating a decision right to a lobbying party may be 
beneficial for both if the lobbying party is reciprocally inclined. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
We use a novel design to investigate whether the possibility of being rewarded in the future 
induces an otherwise neutral decision-maker to favor a more powerful lobbying party at the 
disadvantage of another. In the main part of our experiment, subjects interact in groups of 3, 
with each group member in a different role. Player 1 is a decision-maker who is not directly 
affected by the decisions he takes, and can be seen as representing a public official or 
politician. Player 2 and Player 3 are directly affected by the decision of Player 1, but their 
interests are diametrically opposed. This reflects e.g. the conflicting interests between 
producers and consumers in the face of legislative changes. In the experimental design we 
incorporate that pressure groups are more influential, have easier access to politicians via 
lobbyists and thus an advantage in exerting direct influence compared to consumers. In our 
design, we model this by giving the decision-maker the opportunity to implement the outcome 
preferred by Player 2, but not the preferred outcome of Player 3.  
The experiment consists of two distinct parts and is briefly summarized in Table 1. In 
the first (“preference elicitation”) stage we elicit subjects’ preferences for earnings 
distributions conditional on their role in the game. With the instructions for the first part 
subjects are informed that there will be a second stage afterwards in which their payoffs are to 
be decided, but they do not receive more information about it. In the second (“gift-giving”) 
stage, the decision-maker has to decide whether he ex-post delegates his decision right to the 
more powerful lobbying party, i.e. Player 2. The other players have to decide whether, 
conditional on the outcome, they reward the decision-maker. The experimental instructions 
can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 1: Summary of the experimental design 
1. Stage:   - random assignment of roles (Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3); 
no information about the differences between roles 
- subjects are informed that there will be a second stage and that 
payoffs will be based on the decisions from the first stage 
- each subject makes 12 decisions about the distribution of 
earnings among players 
2. Stage:  New information: Player 1 is the decision-maker 
For each decision situation 
- Player 1 decides if he wants to delegate the decision right such 
that the choice of Player 2 is adopted 
- Players 2 and 3 can reward Player 1 by transferring points; 
transfer decisions are made conditional on the implemented 
option (strategy method) 
- incentivized expectation questions 
End of the experiment Questionnaire on demographics, BIG5 traits and risk aversion 
 
3.1 First Stage 
In the beginning of the preference elicitation stage subjects are randomly assigned to one of 
the three roles in which they remain for the entire experiment. However, they are not matched 
into groups until the second stage, and instructions for the first stage are identical for all 
players and across treatments. 
The purpose of the first stage is to elicit distributional preferences of subjects, in 
particular whether they are motivated by the equity and efficiency consequences of their 
choices. For this reason, subjects make a series of binary decisions between two payoff 
distributions. Option A, the equitable distribution, is the same in each round and corresponds 
to (100, 100, 100), which means that each player receives 100 points if this option is the one 
to be implemented. With Option B, the unequal distribution (100, p, q) Player 1 again earns 
100 points, but the potential payoffs for Player 2 and Player 3 change in each round in a way 
that either p<100<q or p>100>q. In each round p and q vary over the following dimensions:  
(i) Advantage Player 2: whether Player 2 earns more than Player 3, or vice versa 
(ii) Efficiency: whether the sum of all payoffs from Option B is larger, equal to, or 
smaller than 300 points (the total payoff from Option A) 
(iii) Degree of inequality: whether the absolute gap between p and q is only 40 
points (e.g. 120 vs. 80), or 120 points (e.g. 40 vs. 160) 
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Each subject makes 12 decisions. The respective payoffs under Option B are listed in 
Appendix A. In each session the order was randomized.  
At this time, subjects know the role in which they remain also for the second part. In 
addition, they had been informed at the beginning that it will be determined only in the 
second part whose decisions will be payoff-relevant in which round. However, they receive 
no further information about the decision mechanisms, so they have no strategic incentive not 
to reveal their preferred distributions. In particular, subjects do not yet know that Player 1 is 
the decision-maker and that Player 2 is in a more advantageous position than Player 3.  
A key feature of this setup is that Player 1 has no monetary incentive to bias his 
decision in favor of either Option A or B. This reflects the fact that an administrative or 
political decision-maker receives a fixed salary but no direct financial compensation for his 
decisions. This is in contrast to Players 2 and 3, who have an obvious interest to influence the 
outcome, but no decision rights.  
 
3.2 Second Stage 
In the beginning of the second stage, subjects receive a new set of instructions. They learn 
that they will see the previous decision situations again, and that Player 1 is the key player. In 
each round Player 1 decides whether he wants his initial choice between options A and B to 
be relevant for determining the payoffs. Alternatively, he can replace his choice with the 
initial choice of Player 2 (but not Player 3) from the first part. The choice has to be made 
without knowing the actual decisions of the others.2 This setup introduces asymmetry 
between the self-interested players as it provides the decision-maker with an opportunity to do 
Player 2 a favor at the expense of Player 3, but not vice versa.3 
Players 2 and 3 can reward the decision-maker by sending a transfer. As all subjects 
have identical instructions, this is common knowledge from the beginning of the gift-giving 
stage on. In each round the player(s) with the highest earnings can make a transfer to Player 1, 
which is elicited via the strategy method, i.e. conditional on the implemented option. If 
Option B is implemented, one of the two self-interested players earns strictly more and only 
he makes a transfer decision. Following Abbink et al. (2002) and Malmendier and Schmidt 
                                                 
2 By taking the previously made decision of instead of asking Player 2 again, we want to ensure that Player 1 
cannot justify favoring Player 2 by assuming that Player 2 would behave more pro-social if he knows that his 
decision determines the group outcome. 
3 We refer to Players 2 and 3 as “self-interested” players because they have something at stake already in the first 
stage, while Player 1 has by then no own financial interests by construction. However, this changes in the second 
stage when Player 1’s may very well be also guided by pure self-interest.   
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(2011), the transfer is multiplied by 3 to reflect that a bribe generally has a larger marginal 
utility for the receiver. If instead Option A is chosen, earnings are identical and both Player 2 
and Player 3 make a transfer decision. Then the average transfer is multiplied by 3. In this 
way, the expected transfer of a decision-maker is identical across options, assuming Players 2 
and 3 would always send the same amount.4 
Transfers can range between 0 and 25 points. The upper limit is imposed to ensure that 
extreme outliers do not bias the econometric results. Sending an amount equal to the 
maximum of 25 corresponds to a substantial transfer of between 15 and 25 percent of Player 
2’s or Player 3’s total earnings in a particular round. Therefore, it is unlikely that capping 
contributions at 25 imposes a strong restriction even on extremely reciprocally inclined 
subjects.  
After each choice, subjects answer incentivized expectation questions about the other 
players’ behavior. For each possible outcome, subjects in the role of Player 1 have to state 
their beliefs as to whether the other players have made a transfer.  Player 2 and Player 3 have 
to state their beliefs about which option Player 1 has initially chosen and whether he has 
decided to stick to his initial decision or instead accepted the choice of Player 2. Each correct 
prediction is rewarded with 10 additional points. At the end of the experiment, subjects 
complete a short questionnaire with socio-demographic questions, a self-reported risk 
aversion question, and the compact BIG-5 module with 15 questions developed for the 
German Socioeconomic Panel.  
Due to the tripled transfers to Player 1 this experiment bears resemblance to the 
popular trust game of Berg et al. (1995), but note that there are two crucial differences. First, 
our game introduces negative externalities. Thus, the equivalent of trustor and trustee can 
increase their respective payoffs only at the expense of a third party. Second, the trustor does 
not make an investment in the classical sense, i.e. there is no monetary payment to the trustee. 
However, what she does “invest” is her preferred allocation and thus her notion of fairness.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Instead of using the average transfer of Player 2 and 3, we could have allowed that both players can make a 
transfer under B. However, a strictly disadvantaged player would probably not have rewarded Player 1 anyway – 
especially as there is no strategic benefit in doing so. Thus, this would have created an asymmetry between two 
possible senders under Option B vs. one possible plus one extremely unlikely sender under Option A. In this 
case, a risk averse decision-maker might have found Option A more appealing as it increases the likelihood of 
receiving a positive transfer. We thus decided to use the raw transfer of the higher earning individual under B 
and the average of both transfers under A. 
9 
 
3.3 Treatments 
A bribing relationship can be either a one-shot interaction or a repeated situation. Abbink 
(2004) has shown that this makes a difference in a classical corruption setting, and finds that 
the level of corruption is significantly higher with partner matching compared to stranger 
matching. We were thus interested in how repeated interaction affects the degree to which the 
weak position of Player 3 is exploited and whether it fosters the bond between the two 
“partners-in-crime” in the gift-exchange. Therefore, we conducted the experiment under two 
treatment conditions – Partner vs. Stranger. The first stage was identical for both treatments 
because subjects had no information about how groups would be formed. In the second stage, 
the Partner treatment assigned subjects to the same group in each round, while they were 
always matched with different persons in the Stranger treatment. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why the matching protocol should make a difference 
for purely selfish individuals. Unlike in repeated public goods games, for example, there is no 
possibility to build up reputation because we do not provide information about other players’ 
actions during the experiment. We do this in order to keep the number of independent 
observations identical across treatments. Also, in real-life situation it can sometimes be 
difficult or even impossible for the gift-giver to observe whether a public official has already 
carried out the favorable act on behalf of the gift-giver, e.g. when votes are cast anonymously.  
What the treatment variation changes, however, is the degree of responsibility for the 
outcome of others, because a decision-maker can hide behind the veil of ignorance in the 
Stranger treatment. Even if he makes a very harmful decision at the expense of Player 3 he 
may convince himself that other decision-makers treat Player 3 better than he did. In the 
Partner setup, however, an opportunistic decision-maker would always disadvantage the 
same person, thus being fully responsible for the poor outcome of Player 3.  
 
3.4 Implementation 
We conducted in total 6 sessions (3 in Partner, 3 in Stranger) at MELESSA, the experimental 
lab at the University of Munich, and all participants were university students from various 
disciplines.5 The experiment was computerized with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Most sessions were conducted with 21 subjects, but due to non-show-up one Partner session 
was conducted with 18 and one Stranger session with 15 subjects. Subjects earned points 
                                                 
5 Recruitment of subjects was done with the software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). 
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which were converted at an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 150 points. Average earnings were 13 
Euros, and each session lasted approximately 50 minutes. 
 
4 Behavioral Predictions 
In the first stage each subject makes several choices between the equitable distribution A and 
the unequal distribution B. By design, there is always one of the self-interested players who is 
better off with the unequal option, and one who is worse off. In contrast, Player 1 is in a 
neutral position and earns the same in both cases. Therefore, his decisions should reflect 
purely distributional preferences, in particular how the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency is evaluated. If Player 1 is sufficiently inequality averse, he will always opt for 
Option A. However, in cases when B yields a higher overall payoff a decision-maker with 
preferences for efficiency may consider deviating from the equality-preserving choice.  
 
Conjecture 1: Player 2 and Player 3 choose B if their own payoff is higher than with A. 
Player 1 only deviates from the equitable distribution if the unequal option results in 
efficiency gains.  
 
At the beginning of the second stage, Player 1 learns that he can rule his distributional 
decision from the first stage irrelevant and instead adopt the preferred option of Player 2. For 
a purely benevolent decision-maker there is no reason why this possibility would be 
appealing, since adopting the partisan choice of Player 2 is unlikely to result in a better 
outcome in terms of efficiency and equity. In the absence of rewards, a selfish decision-maker 
should be indifferent between sticking to his own and Player 2’s previous choice. When there 
is scope for rewards, however, the decision-maker may strategically favor Player 2 in the 
hope that his action will be reciprocated. 
 
Conjecture 2: With the possibility of being rewarded, decision-makers will strategically 
delegate the decision right to increase their own payoff if Player 2 is the one who benefits 
from giving up the equity-preserving option.  
 
Whether this kind of strategic behavior pays off for Player 1 depends on the reciprocal 
inclinations of the Player 2 subjects. As there is no feedback during the experiment, there is 
also no way to build up reputation, not even in the Partner treatment. Thus, the transfer 
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decisions have no strategic component and an entirely self-interested player would always 
choose to send zero points. Positive transfers reflect purely reciprocal intentions.  
 
Conjecture 3: As it is individually rational to send nothing, we expect a large proportion of 
zero transfers. However, most individuals are reciprocally inclined at least to some degree. 
We thus expect that the transfers of Players 2 and 3 increase in their own earnings from the 
implemented option.  
 
Finally, our experimental design allows us to test whether the introduction of a 
rewards channel changes the aggregate outcome for a group. If the presumably benevolent 
decision of Player 1 is replaced by a decision which was not made in the best interest of all, 
the society as a whole might be worse off. 
 
Conjecture 4: Introducing the possibility that a decision-maker can favor a self-interested 
party in exchange for a reward leads to worse aggregate outcomes. 
 
In the next section we will evaluate these conjectures in turn. 
 
5 Results 
5.1 First Stage 
With 117 subjects making 12 decisions about their preferred allocations we obtain a sample of 
1404 single decisions. Due to the symmetric setting, we have 702 single decisions in cases 
when Option B is better for Player 2 and Player 3, respectively. As mentioned in the previous 
section, we expect that Players 2 and 3 generally opt for B when they earn more from it, while 
Player 1 seeks a compromise between equity and efficiency. Table 2 provides a summary of 
choices in the first stage. More detailed information about the choice frequencies for each 
decision situation can be found in Appendix A.  
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Table 2: Choices in the Preference Elicitation Stage  
 Frequency of choosing B (in percent) 
 total advantage Player 2 advantage Player 3 
Player 1 13.67 12.39 14.96 
Player 2 46.37 89.74 2.99 
Player 3 46.15 2.99 89.31 
#choices 1404 702 702 
 
The comparison across roles reveals that subjects in the role of Player 1 were generally 
reluctant to implement inequality. They opted for B only with 13.67 percent even though in 
one third of the situations it would actually have been efficiency enhancing. However, the 
desire to maintain equity seems to have been sufficiently strong to choose A in most cases. 
This result demonstrates neatly that subjects with no personal stakes in a distribution decision 
hardly ever sacrifice equity between the other involved parties. In contrast, the self-interested 
players clearly opted for B if it was to their advantage – 89.74% of Players 2 and 89.31% of 
Players 3 did so – and clearly avoided B if it was to their disadvantage, with a probability of 
being chosen of less than 3% for both of them.  
These results show that Players 2 and 3 have very similar distributional preferences. In 
addition, we also see that Player 1 did not favor one person at the expense of the other, as the 
probability of choosing B does not depend on who gains more from it.  
In the next step we estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is 1 if a 
subject chooses B, i.e. deviates from the equitable distribution, with standard errors clustered 
by individual to account for the likely error dependence across periods. The first column of 
Table 3 uses only the choices of subjects in the role of Player 1, the second column only those 
of Players 2 and 3. The regressions include two dummies indicating whether the choice of B 
over A results in an overall efficiency gain/loss; an inequality dummy for a large payoff gap 
between Player 2 and Player 3 (a difference of 120 vs. 40 points); a “treatment” dummy (but 
recall that there is no treatment difference in the first stage); and a control for period effects. 
In addition, the first regression includes a dummy for whether it is Player 2 or Player 3 who 
has an advantage from B. The second regression instead includes the amount to be earned 
with option B (which is omitted in column (1) as there is no variation for Player 1). 
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Table 3: Probit model for chosen option (dependent variable = 1 if Option B) 
 (1)  
Player 1 
     (2) 
Players 2&3 
constant -1.229*** 
(0.352) 
-5.182*** 
(0.858) 
advantage Player 2 (0/1) 0.129 
(0.085) 
     - 
      
Option B earnings      - 
      
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
efficiency 20 plus (0/1) 0.797*** 
(0.240) 
-0.078 
(0.176) 
efficiency 20 minus (0/1) 0.140 
(0.097) 
-0.028 
(0.110) 
gap large (0/1) -0.087 
(0.148) 
-1.392*** 
(0.515) 
stranger treatment (0/1) -0.037 
(0.317) 
-0.112 
(0.172) 
period -0.019 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
N 468 936 
log-likelihood -173.8 -239.9 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The results clearly demonstrate that Player 1’s main motive for implementing an unequal 
allocation by choosing B over A is to increase total efficiency. The degree of inequality, i.e. if 
the gap is 120 or only 40 points, does not play a role. Also whether it is Player 2 or Player 3 
who benefits from Option B does not influence the decision of Player 1, which again confirms 
that in this symmetric setting the decision-maker acts as a neutral and benevolent authority. 
Turning to the decisions of Players 2 and 3, the potential earnings under Option B are a highly 
significant predictor for preferring the unequal option (with p-value < 0.001). However, this 
selfish motive is moderated by the significantly negative influence of the size of the gap 
between Players 2 and 3, which reflects a concern for others. Efficiency gains or losses do not 
seem to be important. The “treatment” dummy is insignificant in both regressions, which 
indicates that subjects are comparable in terms of social preferences across treatments. 
Finally, as Player 1 subjects make decisions in which they have nothing to gain at this stage, 
one might be concerned that they get less attentive over time and make their decisions less 
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thoughtfully as the experiment progresses, but we find no time effects which would 
substantiate this concern. 
 
Result 1: Players 2 and 3 generally choose the option which maximizes their payoff, although 
a large degree of inequality moderates selfish behavior. Player 1 wants to preserve equity 
and does not favor one at the expense of the other; he only deviates from the equity-
preserving option if the alternative allocation results in efficiency gains.  
 
5.2  Second Stage: Delegation Decisions of Player 1 
In this section we investigate how decision-makers react to the new information that they can 
do Player 2 a favor by ex-post delegating the decision right about the payable option. 
Conditional on having chosen A in the first stage, decision-makers decide to render their own 
decision irrelevant with a probability of 38.61% and instead let payoffs be determined by the 
first stage decision of Player 2. In the less likely case that a decision-maker has opted for B in 
the preference elicitation stage, the percentage is only slightly higher, at 43.75%. Based on the 
observed frequencies, a Pearson’s chi-squared test does not reject the hypothesis that the 
delegation decision is independent of Player 1’s initial choice in Stage 1 (p-value = 0.434). Of 
course, this comparison of percentages is not informative about the underlying incentives in 
each decision situation, which is why we turn to regression analysis in the next step.  
Table 4 contains results for 3 different probit regressions. The dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if Player 1 delegated his decision right. In column (1) we regress it on the same 
variables used for the estimations reported in Table 3. In column (2) we add Player 1’s beliefs 
about possible transfers from Players 2 and 3, elicited after each round. Finally, column (3) 
adds a set of demographic and behavioral covariates.  
In comparison to Stage 1, the most striking result is that despite the symmetric setup of 
payments, the dummy variable which indicates an advantage for Player 2 from Option B is 
now highly significant. This is due to the non-symmetric setup of the delegation decision. 
Regardless of who gains more from inequality, the decision-maker can only guarantee that the 
option preferred by Player 2 is implemented, but not the option preferred by Player 3. Helping 
to impose an unequal distribution might be explained by the anticipation of potential rewards.  
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Table 4: Probit regression; dependent variable = 1 if Player 1 delegates 
       (1)    (2)    (3) 
constant -0.990*** 
(0.199) 
-1.486*** 
(0.229) 
-2.899*** 
(0.829) 
advantage Player 2 (0/1) 0.775*** 
(0.184) 
0.809*** 
(0.216) 
0.834*** 
(0.224) 
efficiency 20 plus (0/1) 0.240* 
(0.128) 
0.191 
(0.135) 
0.215 
(0.139) 
efficiency 20 minus (0/1) -0.195 
(0.150) 
-0.116 
(0.152) 
-0.123 
(0.158) 
gap large (0/1) 0.220 
(0.134) 
0.071 
(0.138) 
0.062 
(0.146) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 0.357* 
(0.184) 
0.262 
(0.174) 
-0.027 
(0.309) 
period -0.000 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
belief receiving transfer from 
2 or 3 if Option B (0/1) 
 0.669*** 
(0.189) 
0.716*** 
(0.159) 
belief receiving transfer from 
2 if Option A (0/1) 
 0.066 
(0.236) 
0.101 
(0.208) 
belief receiving transfer from 
3 if Option A (0/1) 
 0.052 
(0.235) 
.106 
(.219) 
demographics, risk aversion & 
BIG5 
NO NO YES 
N 468 468 468 
Log-likelihood -284.2           -271.8             -258.3    
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; column (3) 
includes controls for age, gender, lab experience, study major, self-reported risk aversion and BIG5 traits. 
 
We investigate this hypothesis more thoroughly by adding the decision-makers’ 
beliefs about receiving transfers from Players 2 and 3. We find that the expectation of 
receiving a reward from the Player who gained more from B is positively and significantly 
associated with renouncing one’s initial choice. Whether the decision-maker expects to 
receive a reward from either player if option A is implemented does not seem to be important. 
By adding beliefs, the initially significant effect of potential efficiency gains from choosing B 
becomes insignificant, and the spurious correlation with the treatment dummy vanishes. 
Whether subjects interact with partners or strangers has no effect on their decision to 
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implement the preferred option of Player 2. Finally, adding further demographic and 
behavioral covariates does not reveal statistically significant associations, with the exceptions 
that more risk tolerant subjects are more likely to delegate and more conscientious persons are 
less likely to do so (coefficients not reported).  
 
Result 2: In anticipation of potential rewards, decision-makers act opportunistically and are 
significantly more likely to delegate their decision-right if Player 2 gains from inequality. 
 
5.3  Second Stage: Transfer Decisions 
As transfers were elicited via the strategy method, subjects in the role of Player 2 and Player 3 
had to make decisions conditional on Option A or B being the relevant outcome. Subjects 
could transfer any integer number of points between 0 and 25 to the decision-maker. A purely 
self-interested subject would always choose a transfer of 0, because her actions are not 
observable for other players. Note that this holds even in the Partner treatment. A positive 
transfer therefore reflects reciprocal intentions without any strategic considerations.  
Figures 1 & 2 show that indeed the most frequent choice was to send nothing – in 
around 70 percent of cases when the final outcome was Option A and with around 40 percent 
in case it was Option B. However, there is also a nontrivial number of relatively high 
transfers, with multiples of 5 as focal points.  
 
 
0
40
60
80
10
20
30
50
70
P
er
ce
nt
0 5 10 15 20 25
Transfer
Figure 1: Transfer conditional on Player 1 choosing Option A
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Table 5 displays mean transfers by option and role. In case Option A was 
implemented, Player 2 transferred 2.81 points on average, which is slightly more than the 2.11 
points of Player 3 but the difference is statistically indistinguishable. A different picture 
emerges with transfers conditional on Option B being implemented. Again the average 
transfer of Player 2 is larger, but this time the difference is more pronounced (6.96 vs. 4.97 
points) and statistically significant (p-value=0.003). Thus, from the perspective of the 
decision-maker, helping to implement Option A earned him on average 7.39 points (the 
average group transfer of 2.46 multiplied by 3), while he earned 5.97*3 = 17.90 points when 
Option B was implemented.  
 
Table 5: Transfers sent by Players 2 and 3 conditional on implemented option  
Amount sent Mean Std. Dev. N Percentage of 
zero transfers 
if Option A 
implemented 
Player 2 2.81 5.53 468 64.10 % 
Player 3 2.12 5.25 468 74.79 % 
Group average 2.47 5.40 936 69.45 % 
if Option B 
implemented 
Player 2  6.96 7.37 234 29.49 % 
Player 3  4.97 6.87 234 47.01 % 
Group average 5.97 7.19 468 38.25 % 
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Figure 2: Transfer conditional on Player 1 choosing Option B
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As the individually rational strategy for a selfish subject would be to never transfer 
anything, we can further look at subjects individually and classify them in the spirit of the 
“conditional co-operator” vs. “free-rider” distinction of Fischbacher et al. (2001).6 In total 
23.1 percent of Players 2 and 3 (i.e. 18 out of 78) are completely “selfish” across all 12 
decision situations. Table 6 further displays the fraction of subjects that never send any 
transfer, conditioned on the implemented option. Two interesting aspects become evident 
from this table: (i) Player 3 is more likely to be completely unwilling to send a transfer and 
(ii) regardless of their role, subjects are less likely to never reward conditioned on Option B as 
opposed to Option A. 
 
Table 6: Fraction of subjects that never make a transfer conditional on which option is chosen  
Person 2 Person 3 
If Option is A If Option is B If Option is A If Option is B 
28.21 % 17.95 % 48.72 % 33.3 % 
 
We next turn to the determinants of transfer choices. As mentioned before, transfers 
were censored at 25 in order to avoid extreme outliers. As we did not allow transfers to be 
negative, they were also naturally censored from below at 0. We thus use a two-limit Tobit 
model to account for the double censoring, but a one-limit Tobit model with censoring at zero 
or conventional OLS regressions yield very similar results.7  
 The pattern of transfers suggests that reciprocity (positive as well as negative) is the 
key to subjects’ choices. When making the transfer decision conditional on Option A being 
chosen, the earnings for the counterfactual outcome B has a significantly negative effect. In 
contrast, when Option B is implemented, the rewards that Players 2 and 3 send to the 
decision-maker are increasing in their earnings. Perhaps surprisingly, beliefs about the 
decision-maker’s choices in both stages hardly have an effect, with the notable exception that 
Player 2 subjects send a significantly larger reward if they believe that the decision-maker 
delegated the decision right to implement their own preferred option. So Player 2 seems to 
recognize the favor and is willing to reciprocate. Again there are no time effects, and 
treatment differences are mostly insignificant but it is interesting to observe that Player 2 
tends to send more in the Partner treatment, while Player 3 sends less. 
                                                 
6 The equivalent of conditional co-operation in this context is to send a positive transfer in case the implemented 
option is to one’s own advantage, while a free-rider is a subject who never sends a transfer regardless of the 
outcome.  
7 The results are available upon request. 
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Table 7: Two-limit Tobit-Regressions for transfers decisions of Players 2 and 3 
 Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 Player 3 Player 2 Player 3 
Constant 1.087 
(13.44) 
41.81 
(27.5) 
-6.767 
(10.84) 
8.143 
(20.57) 
Option B earnings -0.138*** 
(0.036) 
-0.133*** 
(0.037) 
0.107*** 
(0.036) 
0.147*** 
(0.052) 
gap large (0/1) 2.066** 
(0.951) 
0.167 
(1.39) 
2.583 
(1.943) 
0.294 
(2.145) 
period 0.120 
(0.183) 
-0.178 
(0.162) 
0.002 
(0.134) 
-0.111 
(0.183) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 2.603 
(3.779) 
-4.618 
(4.27) 
1.202 
(3.24) 
-7.839** 
(3.775) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
3.31* 
(1.939) 
0.696 
(2.669) 
1.92 
(2.118) 
2.263 
(2.502) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
2.665 
(1.86) 
-1.45 
(2.436) 
3.951** 
(1.726) 
0.572 
(2.852) 
N 468 468 234 234 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Tobit 
regressions include controls for age, gender, lab experience, and study major. 
 
 
Result 3: While a nontrivial fraction of subjects (23.1 percent) never sends any transfer to the 
decision-maker, the majority of subjects is conditionally cooperative and sends rewards 
which increase in their own earnings. 
 
Setting an upper limit does not impose a restriction on most subjects’ choices (there 
are only 3.56 percent of 25 point transfers) but we observe a large fraction of zero transfers. In 
order to take into account that the excess zeroes could be generated by a different process than 
the transfer choices, we estimate a two-part model with a probit regression in the first stage, 
and OLS in the second stage. The results of the two-part estimation are consistent with the 
two-limit Tobit model and can be found in Appendix B.  
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5.4  Earnings comparison 
In this section we investigate whether a strategy based on mutual gift-giving can serve as a 
worthwhile alternative for the two partners-in-crime of a bribery relationship. To this end, we 
make several comparisons of the average per-round earnings for each player and the total sum 
of per-round earnings, displayed in Table 8. In column (1) we see the players’ payoffs for the 
hypothetical situation that the experiment had ended after the first stage. In other words, this 
is an earnings comparison based on the decision-maker’s social preferences in the absence of 
strategic considerations. By construction, the decision-maker earns exactly 100 points each 
round. The other two players earn significantly more but their earnings are statistically 
indistinguishable across roles (p-value=0.9793), which reflects that most decision-makers 
want to maximize social welfare and opt for the efficiency enhancing option, but have no 
intention to discriminate against any of the players.  
 
Table 8: Comparison of average earnings per round by experimental roles   
 
 
 
Player 
(1) 
Hypothetical earnings 
given Stage 1 choice 
of Player 1 
(2) 
Earnings without 
incentive questions 
and transfers 
(3) 
Earnings without 
incentive questions 
1 100 100 111.96 
2 117.91 109.72 105.44 
3 117.86 92.20 90.81 
Total Earnings 335.77 301.92 308.21 
p-value for test of  
H0: identical earnings 
for 2 and 3 
 
0.9793 
 
<0.0001 
 
<0.0001 
 
However, after the gift-giving opportunity is revealed, an entirely different picture 
emerges. Column (2) contains the actual average “raw” earnings (i.e. net of transfer payments 
and points for correct guesses in the incentivized questions) after stage 2. In the absence of 
transfers, the decision-makers’ earnings remain at 100 points per round. In contrast, Players 2 
and 3 now earn less than before, and a large and statistically highly significant (p-
value<0.0001) gap has opened up between them. This demonstrates that with potential 
rewards the decision-maker now clearly favors Player 2 at the expense of Player 3, even 
though it drastically reduces total welfare. From column (3) it becomes evident that this 
strategy actually pays off for the subjects in the role of Player 1, because when transfers are 
taken into account they can increase their earnings from 100 points to almost 112 points. This 
leads us to our final result which concludes this section.  
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Result 4: Compared to a situation in which the decision-maker acts in the best interest of all 
players, the introduction of a favor vs. reward exchange increases the payoff for Player 2 
relative to Player 3, but reduces aggregate welfare because of negative externalities for the 
disadvantaged party. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Our experiment demonstrates that even when there is no feasible coordination mechanism 
between a potential briber and a bribee, the anticipation of an uncertain future reward can lead 
to biased decisions of a supposedly neutral decision-maker. The role of expectations is 
sufficiently strong to produce an outcome similar to what might have been expected by 
conventional corruption. This shows that even a non-contractible exchange of gifts can serve 
as a viable bribery substitute for lobbying parties who prefer to refrain from illegal acts. 
However, this favor trading leads to negative externalities for the less influential side and 
reduces aggregate welfare.  
From a policy perspective, the results suggest to broaden the focus of anti-corruption 
policies to include measures which increase the uncertainty that a favor can ever be 
reciprocated. Especially the imposition of a waiting period between leaving a political office 
and taking up a private job, and the prolongation of existing waiting periods, should be 
considered. 
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Appendix A: Options and Choices 
 Payoffs with Option B for  
Player 
Efficiency  
relative to 
Option A 
Absolute 
gap between 
2 and 3 
% of Players choosing  
Option B 
Round 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 100 120 80 0 40 10.26 94.87 2.56 
2 100 30 150 –20 120 12.82 0 84.62 
3 100 130 90 +20 40 28.21 97.44 10.26 
4 100 110 70 –20 40 7.69 76.92 0 
5 100 160 40 0 120 2.56 87.18 0 
6 100 170 50 +20 120 15.38 94.87 5.13 
7 100 70 110 –20 40 5.13 2.56 71.79 
8 100 90 130 +20 40 28.21 12.82 97.44 
9 100 80 120 0 40 7.69 0 97.44 
10 100 50 170 +20 120 28.21 2.56 94.87 
11 100 40 160 0 120 7.69 0 89.74 
12 100 150 30 –20 120 10.26 87.18 0 
Mean 100 100 100 0 80 13.67 46.37 46.15 
Note: in each session the order was randomly determined. 
 
Appendix B: Two-Part Model for Transfer Decisions 
Part 1: Probit (transfer>0) 
 
 
Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 
    
Player 3 
    
Player 2 
    
Player 3 
    constant -0.325  
(1.423) 
2.508  
(2.253) 
-2.493  
(1.748) 
0.702 
(2.831) 
Option B earnings -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.0055  
(0.007) 
0.007  
(0.008) 
gap large (0/1) 0.122  
(0.095) 
-0.104  
(0.107) 
0.0369  
(0.293) 
0.042 
(0.291) 
period -0.002  
(0.019) 
-0.019 
(0.0148) 
0.006  
(0.026) 
-0.009  
(0.023) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 0.196  
(0.408) 
-0.357  
(0.351) 
0.5053  
(0.493) 
-0.937** 
(0.428) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
0.170  
(0.408) 
-0.0263 
(0.180) 
0.267  
(0.310) 
0.320  
(0.334) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
0.131  
(0.186) 
-0.166  
(0.199) 
0.119  
(0.274) 
-0.073  
(0.337)    
N 468 468 234 234 
Log-likelihood -253.6 -116.3 -233.2 -139.5 
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Part 2: OLS conditional on transfer > 0 
 Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 
    
Player 3 
    
Player 2 
    
Player 3 
    Constant 13.57  
(8.432) 
73.42*** 
(13.67) 
0.509  
(8.94) 
15.94  
(12.64) 
Option B earnings -0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
0.142*** 
(0.036) 
0.181*** 
(0.058) 
gap large (0/1) 2.200**  
(0.900) 
1.760  
(1.059) 
1.224  
(1.701) 
-1.450 
(2.218) 
period 0.152  
(0.167) 
-0.004  
(0.200) 
0.014  
(0.117) 
0.138  
(0.173) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 1.087  
(2.515) 
3.474* 
(1.817) 
-0.408  
(2.077) 
0.485 
(2.203) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
3.484** 
(1.522) 
1.733  
(1.959) 
0.463  
(1.063) 
-0.276  
(1.686) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
1.885*  
(1.009) 
0.036  
(1.151) 
3.037*** 
(0.996) 
0.952  
(1.747) 
N 168 165 118 124 
R-squared 0.286 0.426 0.527 0.360 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  
Regressions in both parts include controls for age, gender, lab experience, and study major. 
 
Summary: Conditional on Option A being the outcome, there is a negative and highly 
significant relationship between the probability of sending a positive transfer and the foregone 
earnings under the alternative option (columns 1 and 2). In other words, Players 2 and 3 
refuse to reward the decision-maker for Option A if they would have preferred the 
counterfactual. We have seen before that subjects generally transfer more under B, but the 
binary transfer choice does not depend significantly on the points earned (column 3 and 4). In 
Part 2, we again observe the same “punishment” pattern as under A (columns 5 and 6). 
Conditional on B, the amount earned is now a highly significant predictor for the transferred 
points (columns 7 and 8), so the more an outcome is beneficial for Player 2, the higher is the 
expected reward for the decision-maker. As in the one-step estimation, none of the other 
covariates has a consistently significant influence on any of the two choice components.  
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Appendix C: Instructions 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! Please read the following 
instructions carefully. They are identical for all participants, so you will receive the same 
information as the other participants. The decisions that you and others make in this 
experiment will determine your earnings, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. In addition, you will receive 4 Euros for showing up in time. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with others, use mobile 
devices, or run other programs on your PC. If you fail to comply with these rules, we have to 
exclude you from the experiment and all the payoffs. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand. We will then come to your seat and answer your question in private. If the question is 
relevant for all participants, we will repeat and answer the question for all participants. 
During this experiment we will refer not to Euros, but to points. At the end of the experiment 
your total points over all rounds will be converted to Euros at an exchange rate of  
150 points = 1 Euro 
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part you will have to make a number of 
decisions. Which of them are relevant for your payoff will be determined in the second stage. 
You will be informed about the rules for the second part after the first part is completed. 
 
 
Instructions for Part 1: 
In this experiment there will be three roles, which we will refer to as Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be randomly allocated to one of these roles at the beginning of the 
experiment, and remain in the same role until the end. 
 
The decision situation: 
In this experiment you will have to make a series of decisions. Each decision consists of a 
choice between 2 possible options: Option A and Option B. The two options denote different 
possible payoffs for each player involved. 
 
Example 1: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
 
With Option A each person earns 100 points. With option B, Player 1 earns 100 points, Player 
2 earns 120 points, and Player 3 earns 80 points. 
 
Before you start, the computer will randomly determine your role. Then you will make a 
series of decisions in which Option A will always result in 100 points for all players. With 
Option B the payoffs will vary in each round. Depending on your role, you may prefer either 
Option A or Option B. Whose decision will be relevant for your earnings will only be 
determined in the second part of the experiment. 
 
Test: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 ??? 40 
Player 3 100 160 
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Suppose you are Player 3: How many points would you get with Option B?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 1: How many points would you get with Option A?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 2: How many points would you get with Option B?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 2: How many points would you get with Option A?   _____ 
 
 
Instructions for Part 2: 
In this part of the experiment it will be determined which option will be paid in which round. 
You can earn additional points by correctly answering some questions about which decisions 
you expect others to have taken. The sum of your points over all rounds constitutes your 
earnings. 
On your screen you will now see the same decision situations as in the first part, in 
identical order. As before, you will see the decision situation on the left hand side. On the 
right hand side you can make your decisions for this part and answer the questions to increase 
your payoff. You will not receive any information about the decisions of other participants, 
neither during nor after the experiment. 
[Only Stranger:] For each round, groups consisting of one Player 1, one Player 2, and one 
Player 3 will be randomly formed. In each round, the groups will be formed anew. 
[Only Partner:] In the first round of this part, a group consisting of one Player 1, one Player 
2, and one Player 3 will be randomly formed. You will remain in this group until the end of 
the experiment. 
 
 
The Decision of Player 1: 
The person which decides about the option to be implemented is Player 1. As you have seen 
in the first part, Player 1 earns 100 points regardless of which option is chosen. 
Now Player 1 has two possible choices: 
1. He/she can decide that his/her initial choice from Part 1 remains valid 
2. He/she can decide that instead the choice of Player 2 from Part 1 will be valid (without 
knowing, which option has actually been by Player 2). 
 
Example 2: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
 
Suppose Player 1 has chosen Option A in Part 1, while Player 2 has chosen Option B. 
Player 1 will now receive the following information on the screen: 
 
YOUR DECISION WAS  A 
Do you instead prefer the choice of Player 2 to be valid? 
□ YES   
□ NO 
 
If Player 1 opts for NO, his/her initial choice remains valid. Here this would be option A. In 
this case, each player in the group earns 100 points. 
If Player 1 opts for YES, the initial choice of Player 2 will become valid. Here this would be 
option B. In this case, Player 1 earns 100 points, Player 2 120 points, and Player 3 80 points. 
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The Decision of Player 2 and Player 3: 
After each round, the person with the highest earnings in this round (or both Player 2 and 
Player 3, in case they earn the same) can transfer part of their earnings to Player 1.  
Player 2 and Player 3 will have to make this decision without actually knowing, which option 
will be valid in a particular round. In other words, both decide how much they want to 
transfer to Player 1 if Option A will be relevant for payoff, AND how much they want to 
transfer to Player 1 if Option B will be relevant for payoff. 
 
If Option A is relevant for Payoff: 
In this case, Player 2 and Player 3 earn 100 points each. Both earn the same, so both can make 
a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Person 1. The transfers of Player 2 and Player 3 are 
multiplied by 1.5 (i.e. the average transfer is multiplied by 3), and transferred to Player 1. 
 
If Option B is relevant for Payoff: 
Case 1: Player 2 earns more with Option B than Player 3 (as in example 1) 
In this case, Player 2 can transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1. The transfer will be 
multiplied by 3 and transferred to Player 1. Player 3 has no decision to make. 
Case 2: Player 3 earns more with Option B than Player 2 (as in the following example) 
 
Example 3: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 80 
Player 3 100 120 
 
In this case, Player 3 can transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1. The transfer will be 
multiplied by 3 and transferred to Player 1. Player 2 has no decision to make. 
After each round, you will be asked to guess what the other players in your group decided, 
and you can earn additional points for each correct guess. If you are Player 1 you will be 
asked to guess which transfers Player 2 or Player 3 made. As Player 2 and Player 3 you will 
be asked to guess which option Player 1 has initially chosen and whether he/she has decided 
to stick to his initial choice. Think carefully before you answer – each correct guess will earn 
you 10 additional points.  
 
Summary: 
Player 1 decides for each decision situation whether his/her initially chosen option will be 
relevant for payoff, or whether instead the option chosen by Player 2 is relevant. 
Player 2 and Player 3 decide for each decision situation how many points (0-25) they want to 
transfer to Player 1, both in case that Player 1 has chosen Option A and in case Player 1 has 
chosen Option B. 
[Only Stranger:] In each round you will be randomly allocated to a new group of three.  
[Only Partner:] In each round you will interact with the same group members.  
After the last round, all your points will be added up and converted. Then you will have to 
complete a short questionnaire and you will receive your earnings.   
Consider again some of the examples from above:  
 
Example 1 (cont’d): 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
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Option A will be the valid option  
- If Player 1 has initially chosen Option A and decides in Part 2 that it remains valid  
- If Player 1 decides that instead the choice of Player 2 is decisive, and Player 2 has 
initially chosen Option A. 
In this case, both Player 2 and Player 3 can make a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 
1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 5 points and transfer of Player 3: 15 points 
Both transfers are multiplied by 1.5 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 1,5*5 + 1,5*15 = 130 
- Player 2: 100 – 5 = 95 
- Player 3: 100 – 15 = 85 
 
Option B will be the valid option  
- If Player 1 has initially chosen Option B, and decides in Part 2 that it remains valid  
- If Player 1 decides that instead the choice of Player 2 is decisive, and Player 2 has 
initially chosen Option B. 
In this case, Player 2 earns more than Player 3 and can make a transfer between 0 and 25 
points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 25 points 
The transfer of Player 2 is multiplied by 3 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 3*25 = 175 
- Player 2: 120 – 25 = 95 
- Player 3: 80 
 
Example 3 (cont’d): 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 80 
Player 3 100 120 
 
Suppose Option A is valid. In this case, both Player 2 and Player 3 can transfer between 0 and 
25 points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 0 points and transfer of Player 3: 20 points 
Both transfers are multiplied by 1.5 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 1,5*0 + 1,5*20 = 130 
- Player 2: 100 – 0 = 100 
- Player 3: 100 – 20 = 80 
Now suppose that instead Option B is valid. In this case, Player 3 earns more than Player 2 
and can make a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 3: 6 points 
The transfer of Player 3 is multiplied by 3 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 3*6 = 118 
- Player 2: 80 
- Player 3: 120 – 6 = 114 
 
 
